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KEY POINTS
 An effective occupational program is a key aspect of preventing the acquisition of an
infection by health care providers through pre-exposure assessment of immunity to
vaccine-preventable diseases and immediate access to medical evaluation for postexpo-
sure prophylaxis (PEP) after exposure to a communicable disease.
 All health care providers should be immune to mumps, measles, rubella, varicella,
pertussis, and influenza. Health care providers with the potential for blood or body fluid
exposure should also be immune to hepatitis B.
 PEP is available after exposure to several diseases, including hepatitis A, hepatitis B, HIV,
measles, pertussis, invasive meningococcal infection, and syphilis.
 Health care personnel (HCP) with certain communicable disease need to be evaluated for
work restrictions or furlough.INTRODUCTION
Health care is the fastest-growing sector of the US economy, employing more than 18
million persons.1 HCP face a range of noninfectious hazards on the job, including back
injuries, strains and sprains, latex allergy, violence, and stress.1 HCP are also
commonly exposed to infectious agents via sharp injuries (eg, hepatitis C virus
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care (eg, respiratory viruses, gastrointestinal pathogens, and pertussis), and the 
contaminated environment (eg, Clostridium difficile). Cases of nonfatal occupational 
injury and illness among HCP are among the highest of any industry sector.1 The risks 
and methods preventing occupational acquisition of infection by HCP have been 
reviewed.2–7 Minimizing the risk of disease acquisition is based on 6 key recommen-
ded practices: (1) proper training of HCP at initiation of health care practice and annu-
ally (eg, infection control practices and sharp injury prevention); (2) immunity to 
vaccine-preventable diseases2,6,8–11; (3) evaluation of HCP who were exposed to 
communicable diseases for receipt of PEP2,12–14; (4) adherence to standard precau-
tions when providing patient care,15 especially the performance of appropriate hand 
hygiene before and after patient care16–18; (5) rapid institution of appropriate isolation 
precautions for patients with a known or suspected communicable disease15,19,20; 
and (6) proper use of personal protective equipment, such as masks, N95 respirators, 
eye protection, and gowns when caring for patients with potentially communicable 
diseases.15,21 Prevention of laboratory-acquired infection requires adherence to rec-
ommended administrative protocols (eg, no eating, drinking, or smoking in areas 
where microbiologic or pathologic samples are processed), engineering controls 
(eg, containment hoods), personal protective equipment (eg, N95 masks when 
culturing Mycobacterium tuberculosis), and appropriate immunizations.22,23DEFINITIONS
HCP refers to all paid and unpaid persons providing services in health care settings 
who have the potential for exposure to patients and/or infectious materials, including 
body substances, contaminated medical supplies and equipment, contaminated envi-
ronmental surfaces, or contaminated air. These HCP may include but are not limited to 
those listed in Box 1. In general, HCP who have regular or frequent contact with pa-
tients, body fluids, or specimens have a higher risk of acquiring or transmitting infec-
tions than do HCP who have only brief contact with patients and their environment (eg, 
beds, food trays, and medical equipment). All HCP who work within the confines of a 
health care facility, however should be covered by the occupational health service 
(OHS) and receive appropriate screening and pre-exposure prophylaxis even if they 
do not provide direct patient care because they frequently interact with HCP providing 
direct care and are, therefore, at risk for acquiring or transmitting infectious 
pathogens.Box 1
Health care personnel whose care should be covered by an occupational health service
 Emergency medical service personnel
 Nurse and nursing assistants
 Physicians and dentists
 Technicians
 Therapists (eg, occupational health, physical, and respiratory care)
 Pharmacists
 Students and trainees
 Contractual staff not employed by the health care facility
 Persons not directly involved in patient care (eg, clerical, dietary, housekeeping, laundry,
security, maintenance, administrative, billing, volunteers, laboratory, and mortuary)
Health care settings refers to locations where health care is provided and includes,
but is not limited to, facilities that provide acute care, long-term care, assisted living,
rehabilitation, home health, dialysis, and ambulatory surgery. It also includes vehicles
that transport patients (eg, ambulances, medical helicopters, and planes).
Occupational health programs refer to formal, well-designed, organized plans that
provide OHSs to HCP. Most commonly, OHSs are provided onsite within the health
care facility in which HCP are performing patient care but may also be provided offsite.
Occupational health programs should include a variety of activities designed to mini-
mize the risk for HCP to acquire an infectious disease, to evaluate HCPwith a potential
exposure to a communicable disease, and to evaluate HCP with a communicable dis-
ease (Box 2).
Occupational health programs should be aware of appropriate guidelines from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and professional organizations. They
should adhere to appropriate state and federal laws and regulations. Specific regula-
tions promulgated by the US Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)
related to HCP include Bloodborne Pathogens (1910.1030)24 and Tuberculosis/Respi-
ratory Protection (1910.134).25 The federal Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act (HR
5178), which was enacted in 2000, requires the use of safety engineered devices
whenever possible to reduce the likelihood of sharp injuries.26PRE-EXPOSURE SCREENING AND IMMUNIZATIONS
Pre-exposure Screening
All new HCP should undergo a new personnel orientation. As part of the orientation
process, new HCP should undergo screening and education directed at reducing
the risk of acquisition of infection diseases by health care providers (see Box 2). All
information obtained should be entered into an electronic database.
Immunizations
General recommendations regarding vaccination of HCP have been published by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),2 the Advisory Committee on Immu-
nization Practices (ACIP),8,27,28 the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP),11 and the
Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC).10 The
most recent ACIP recommendations, which are summarized yearly, should always
be consulted.28 It is recommended that all HCP be immune to mumps, measles,
rubella, varicella, pertussis, and influenza.2,8,10,27,28 Depending on the vaccine-
preventable disease, immunity may be assured by several different measures
(Table 1). HCP who are not immune should receive appropriate immunization(s)
(Table 2). Even if HCP are considered immune to a vaccine-preventable disease trans-
mitted by the droplet (pertussis, invasive meningococcal infection, mumps, or rubella)
or airborne route (varicella), they should wear a mask (don prior to entering the room)
while providing care to a patient with one of these disease because immunization is
not 100% effective in preventing infection.
All HCP with potential exposure to blood or body fluids should be immune to hep-
atitis B. Influenza vaccine should be offered to all HCP yearly. In the past few years,
editorials and commentaries have recommended that yearly influenza immunization
(unless contraindicated) should be a condition of employment for HCP.29–31 In
February 2012, the National Vaccine Advisory Committee issued a statement that pro-
vided recommendations on how to achieve the Healthy People 2020 annual influenza
vaccine coverage goal (90%) for HCP; for facilities that have implemented the recom-
mended initial strategies but have “not consistently achieved the Healthy People goal
Box 2
Components of an occupational health service for health care personnel
At initial of employment or patient care
 Evaluation for ability to perform job functions
 Screen for illicit drugs
 Medical evaluation of selected HCP
 Department of transportation (required for use of certain motor vehicles)
 Flight physical (required of pilots)
 Police/security for use of weapons
 Review of immunity to vaccine-preventable diseases (see Tables 1 and 2)
 Evaluation for tuberculosis
 Symptom review for active tuberculosis
 Testing for latent tuberculosis (TST or IGRA)
 Allergy screening for common health care–associated products
 Latex/natural rubber, germicides (antiseptics and disinfectants)
 Counseling for pregnant or immunocompromised personnel (voluntary)
 Education
 Fire and electrical safety
 Prevention of sharps injury
 Appropriate hand hygiene and proper use of personal protective equipment
 Workplace violence
 Disaster planning: weather, bomb threats, biothreats, chemical spills
 Reporting infectious disease exposures, injuries, illnesses
 OHSA required (if applicable): blood-borne pathogens, tuberculosis/respiratory protection
Annual
 Evaluation for tuberculosis
 Review of immunity to vaccine-preventable diseases
 Influenza immunization
 Miscellaneous
 Hearing evaluation if part of OSHA-required hearing conservation program
 Test for color blindness if performing high level disinfection
 Education
 OHSA required (if applicable): blood-borne pathogens, tuberculosis/respiratory protection
 Others as recommended/required by health care facility
When needed
 Evaluation for possible communicable disease
 Consideration for treatment and job restriction/furlough if disease poses threat to patients
or other HCP
 Evaluation for PEP
 Consideration for treatment and job restriction/furlough if disease poses threat to patients
or other HCP
 Evaluation of injured personnel (eg, strains, sprains, and lacerations)
 Provide first aid
 Refer to emergency department or specialize clinic for severe injuries
 Provide long-term care
 Communicate with workers’ compensation department
 Return to work evaluation for non–work-related injuries/illnesses
 Fit for duty examination (may include drug and alcohol testing)
Abbreviations: IGRA, interferon gamma release assay; TST, tuberculin skin test.
Table 1












Mumps (MMR) Yesb Yesd Yes No Yes
Measles (MMR) Yesb Yesc Yes No Yes
Rubella (MMR) Yesb,c No Yes No Yes
Varicella No Yes Yes Yese Yes
Hepatitis B No — 10 mIU/mLf No Yes
Pertussis (Tdap) No No No No Yes
Influenza No No No No Yes
Yes in any column is acceptable evidence of immunity. Greater than 96% of HCP born before 1957
were demonstrated to be immune to measles, mumps or and rubella (2006–2008).118
a Written documentation (ie, signed by a health care provider).
b Consider immunization of HCP born before 1957; recommend during an outbreak.
c All HCP of childbearing potential should be immunized.
d Requires laboratory confirmation of infection.
e Based on published literature: greater than 97% of HCP born before 1980 were demonstrated
to be immune to varicella in 2014.119
f Obtain anti-HBs titer, 1 to 2 months post last vaccine dose; if immunization remote and anti-
HBs titer not available, see text for management.
Adapted from Weber DJ, Rutala WA, Schaffner W. Immunization for vaccine-preventable
diseases: why aren’t we protecting our students? Infect Contr Hosp Epidemiology 2011;32:912–4.for vaccination coverage of HCP in an efficient and timely manner,” it was recommen-
ded that they should “strongly consider an employer requirement for influenza immu-
nization.”32 HCP should be provided vaccines that are recommended for adults,28
such as human papillomavirus, herpes zoster (HZ), and pneumococcal vaccines, or
referred to their local medical provider. In special circumstances, HCP and laboratory
personnel and researchers should be offered immunization with other vaccines,
including polio, rabies, hepatitis A, vaccinia (smallpox), and anthrax (Box 3). In addi-
tion, HCPwho are traveling outside the United States for work-related activities should
be evaluated and provided CDC recommended immunizations, such as typhoid,
cholera, and Japanese encephalitis.33,34
Immunocompromised HCP require special consideration in the provision of immu-
nizations.8,27,28,35 First, live, attenuated virus vaccines (eg, measles-mumps-rubella
[MMR] vaccine; varicella vaccine; and live, attenuated influenza vaccine [LAIV]) may
be contraindicated. Second, vaccines not routinely recommended may be indicated
(eg, pneumococcal, meningococcal, Haemophilus influenzae type b). Third, higher an-
tigen doses (eg, hepatitis B vaccine in people with end-stage renal disease), additional
doses of vaccine (eg, rabies vaccine in immunocompromised persons), or postimmu-
nization serologic evaluation may be indicated (eg, antibody to hepatitis B surface an-
tigen [anti-HBs] titer after hepatitis B vaccine or antibody response to rabies vaccine)
because immunization of immunocompromised people may elicit a lower antibody
response. Finally, such personnel should be individually evaluated for reassignment
(with the consent of the employee) depending on their job duties. Caring for an immu-
nocompromised patient is not a contraindication to receipt of a live, attenuated vac-
cine, although HCP receiving LAIV should not work in a protected environment (eg,
stem cell transplant unit) for 7 days postimmunization.28,36
Table 2
Immunizations recommended for nonimmune health care personnel
Vaccine Health Care Personnel Comments
Mumps All (2 doses) Provide as MMR
Measles All (2 doses) Provide as MMR
Rubella All (1 dose) Provide as MMR
Varicella All (2 doses) —
Hepatitis B HCP with potential








dose; booster every 5 y)
Use conjugate vaccine for HCP 18–54 y of age







Tdap All (1 dose; no boosters
recommended)
Especially important for HCP who have contact
with children
Influenza All (1 dose each year) HCP who care for severely
immunocompromised persons who require
care in a protected environment should
receive IIV or RIV; HCP who receive LAIV
should avoid providing care for severely
immunocompromised persons (ie, persons
receiving care in “protected” hospital unit,
such as BMTU) for 7 d after immunization.
Abbreviations: BMTU, bone marrow transplant unit; IIV, inactivated influenza vaccine; RIV, recom-
binant influenza vaccine.Pregnant HCP also require special consideration in the provision of immunizations.
The risks from immunization during pregnancy are largely theoretic.27 The benefit of im-
munization among pregnant women usually outweighs the potential risks for adverse
reactions, especially when the risk for disease exposure is high, infection would
pose a special risk to the mother or fetus, and the vaccine is unlikely to cause
harm.27,28,37–40 Furthermore, newer information continues to confirm the safety of
vaccines given inadvertently during pregnancy. Ideally, women of childbearing age,
including HCP, should have been immunized against measles, mumps, rubella, vari-
cella, tetanus, diphtheria, pertussis, meningococcus, polio, hepatitis A, and hepatitis
B as children or adolescents before becoming pregnant. Because this may not have
occurred, however, it is especially important that all HCP be screened for immunity
to vaccine-preventable diseases. Nevertheless, live, attenuated vaccines should be
provided only to nonpregnant HCP and deferred for pregnant women. The ACIP has
recommended that “healthcare personnel should administer [tetanus toxoid, reduced
diphtheria toxoid, and acellular pertussis] Tdap during all pregnancies, preferably dur-
ing the third or late second trimester (after 20 weeks’ gestation).” If not administered
during pregnancy, Tdap should be administered immediately postpartum. Women
who are pregnant during respiratory virus season should receive inactivated influenza
immunization.28 There is no convincing evidence of risk from immunizing pregnant
women with other inactivated virus or bacterial vaccines, or toxoids. Susceptible preg-
nant women at high risk for specific infections should receive, as indicated, the
Box 3
Special use vaccines
 Anthrax: PEP, research, biothreat attack
 Diphtheria (Tdap): Outbreak
 Hepatitis A: PEP, outbreak, travel
 Hepatitis B: PEP, travel
 Measles (MMR): PEP, outbreak
 Meningococcal serotypes A, C, W, Y: outbreak, travel
 Meningococcal serotype B: outbreak
 Mumps (MMR): outbreak
 Pertussis (Tdap): outbreak
 Poliomyelitis: research, outbreak
 Rabies: PEP, research, travel
 Rubella (MMR): outbreak
 Smallpox (Vaccinia): PEP, research, biothreat attack
 Tetanus (Tdap or Td): PEP
 Varicella: PEP, outbreak
 Vaccinia (smallpox): PEP, research, biothreat attack
Additional vaccines may be recommended for researchers or travel, such as yellow fever, Japa-
nese encephalitis, cholera, and so forth.
Abbreviation: PEP, postexposure prophylaxis.following vaccines: hepatitis A, hepatitis B, pneumococcal polysaccharide, meningo-
coccal, rabies, and poliovirus (inactivated) (see Box 3).27 The indications for use of
immunoglobulin preparations are the same in pregnant and nonpregnant women.
Breastfeeding does not adversely affect the response to immunization and is not a
contraindication for any of the currently routinely recommended vaccines.
Before the administration of any vaccine, HCP should be evaluated for the presence
of condition(s) that are listed as a vaccine contraindication or precaution.27 If such a
condition is present, the risks and benefits of vaccination need to be carefully weighed
by the health care provider and the patient. The most common contraindication is a
history of an anaphylactic reaction to a previous dose of the vaccine or to a vaccine
component. Factors that are not contraindications to immunization include the
following: household contact with a pregnant woman; breastfeeding; reaction to a pre-
vious vaccination, consisting only of mild to moderate local tenderness, swelling, or
both, or fever less than 40.5C; mild acute illness with or without low-grade fever; cur-
rent antimicrobial therapy (except for oral typhoid vaccine) or convalescence from a
recent illness; personal history of allergies except a history of an anaphylactic reaction
to a vaccine component; and family history of allergies, serious adverse reactions to
vaccination, or seizures.27POSTEXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS
General guidelines on PEP are available from the CDC,2 ACIP,8 AAP,41 APIC,7 and the
American Public Health Association (APHA).42 All HCP should be educated at their
initiation of employment or providing service when and how to report an infectious dis-
ease exposure. In general, HCP should complete an incident form, have it signed by 
their supervisor, and then report to the occupational health clinic. Occupational health 
evaluation should be available 24/7 for exposed HCP. The incident form should be 
reviewed by occupational health and communicated to the workers’ compensation 
department. HCP with serious or life-threating injuries or exposures should be referred 
to an emergency department or specialty clinic as appropriate. If patient or visitor ex-
posures also occurred, the infection control department should be notified.
A well-defined protocol should be in place that details the steps in evaluation of an 
HCP potentially exposed to an infectious agent (Box 4). Proper counseling of the 
exposed HCP is critical (Box 5). Appropriate first aid should be provided, including 
proper care of any sharp injury or mucosal membrane exposure (eg, copious rinsing 
of eyes in the case of splash to eyes). A proper evaluation of the source case should 
also be conducted to confirm the report by the exposed HCP that the source patient 
does have a communicable disease. Appropriate laboratory tests should be obtained 
from the source patient to determine if the source patient can transmit HIV, HBV, or 
HCV.
PEP is available for many diseases, including but not limited to, diphtheria, hepa-
titis A and B, HIV, influenza, measles, invasive meningococcal infection, pertussis, 
rabies, syphilis, tuberculosis, and varicella-zoster. PEP is also available for some ex-
posures, including animal bites (eg, dogs, cats, rodents, and primates) and human 
bites. Unfortunately, PEP is not available for exposure to arboviruses, hepatitis C, 
mumps, parvovirus B-19, rubella, and Middle East respiratory syndrome–coronavi-
rus. PEP may consist of antivirals, antibiotics, immunoglobulin preparations and/or 
vaccines (see Box 3). Immunoglobulin preparations may be indicated as part of 
PEP for exposure to hepatitis A (immune globulin [IG]), hepatitis B IG (HBIG), measles 
(IG), rabies IG, tetanus (tetanus IG), varicella (varicella-zoster IG), and vaccinia 
(vaccinia IG). More than 1 modality may be recommended. Pre-exposure prophylaxis 
with recommended immunization is not considered sufficient protection after an 
exposure to the following diseases, and postexposure antimicrobial prophylaxis is 
still recommended: pertussis, invasive meningococcal infection, and diphtheria (dis-
cussed later).Box 4
Management of an infectious disease exposure
 Obtain name, medical record number, and location of source case
 Determine if source case has an infection and is infectious (ie, capable of transmitting
infection)
 Determine if transmission possible (ie, appropriate exposure without appropriate personal
protection)
 Determine if health care provider is susceptible (may require laboratory tests)
 Determine if PEP is available and indicated
 Consider alternative prophylaxis (if available) if health care provider has a contraindication
to the prophylaxis of first choice
 Administer prophylaxis with informed consent (HCP may choose not to accept prophylaxis)
 Arrange follow-up
 Document all of the above in the medical record
Box 5
Postexposure prophylaxis counseling of the exposed health care provider
 Information to be provided to health care providers who are exposed to an infectious agent
 Risk (if known) of acquiring the infectious disease
 Risk (if known) of transmitting any infection that is acquired to patients, other HCP, and
contacts (eg, household members)
 Methods of preventing transmission of infection to other persons
 Need for work restrictions (if any)
 Recommended follow-up
 Information to be provided to health care providers who are offered prophylaxis
 Recommendations for prophylaxis
 Alternative methods of prophylaxis if the primary method is contraindicated
 Degree of protection provided by the therapy
 Potential side effects of the therapy
 Safety laboratory tests (if recommended)
 Risks (if known) of infection if PEP is refusedSharp Injuries
Occupational blood and body fluid exposures to blood-borne pathogens remain a
serious public health concern.43 The CDC estimates that 5.6 million workers in the
health care industry and related occupations are at risk of occupational exposure to
blood-borne pathogens. More than 30 different pathogens have caused documented
occupational infection after exposure to blood or body fluids in HCP or hospital labo-
ratory personnel.44 The most important blood-borne pathogens are HIV, HBV, and
HCV.44,45 The key features for assessing the risk of transmission of HBV, HCV, and
HIV are for each agent their seroprevalence in the general population, their environ-
mental survival, and transmissibility via percutaneous, mucous membrane or nonin-
tact skin exposure. The seroprevalence of these viruses in the general population is
HBV approximately 0.4%, HCV approximately 1.3%, and HIV approximately
0.31%.46 HBV has been demonstrated to survive and remain infectious greater than
7 days on environmental surfaces.47 The data on HCV environmental survival are var-
ied, with articles reporting survival of 16 hours,48 5 days,49 and up to 6 weeks.50 For
HIV, the half-life has been reported as 28 hours,51 with a maximum of several
days.52 The risk of transmission of HBV depends on the route of exposure, whether
the exposed person is immune (via immunization or natural infection), and serologic
status of the source patient. Rates of clinical hepatitis/serologic evidence of HBV
infection in susceptible exposed HCP after a percutaneous exposure have been re-
ported as 22% to 31%/37% to 62% if the source is hepatitis B surface antigen
(HBsAg) positive and but hepatitis B e antigen (HBeAg) positive; rates of transmission
have been reported as 1% to 6%/23% to 37% if the source is HBsAg positive but
HBeAg negative.53 The risk of transmission of HCV after percutaneous exposure
has been reported as 1.8% to 1.9% (range, 0%–7%).46,54 The risk of transmission
of HIV after percutaneous exposure has been reported as 0.3% (95% CI, 0.2%–
0.5%).46
In addition to percutaneous transmission, the blood-borne viruses HBV, HCV, and
HIV can be transmitted via blood or contaminated fluid exposure of mucous mem-
branes, nonintact skin, or human bites. The risk of transmission by these routes has
not been quantitated for HBV and HCV. The risk of transmission by the mucosal route
for HIV has been reported to be 0.09% (95% CI, 0.01%–0.5%).46 The risk of transmis-
sion of HIV via exposure of nonintact skin is likely less than 0.1% but has not been
completely quantified. The risk from a human bite has also not been quantified. Trans-
mission of HBV,55 HCV,56 and HIV57 by human bites, however, has been reported. Hu-
man bites that penetrate the skin, however, should be considered as possible 2-way 
exposure (from patient-to-HCP and HCP-to-patient).
The CDC has estimated that approximately 385,000 percutaneous injuries occurred 
annually among HCP in the United States in the time period of 1997 to 1998.43 
Although the incidence of needlestick injuries has been reduced by advances in edu-
cation, needle disposal, engineering changes, and personnel protection, institutions 
and HCP must continue to assume responsibility in further lowering the risk. Several 
methods of reducing exposure to blood and other potential infectious body fluids 
have been described (Box 6).
All occupational exposures to blood and other potentially infectious material place 
HCP at risk for infection with a blood-borne pathogen. OSHA defines blood to mean 
human blood, blood components, and products made from human blood.24 Other 
potentially infectious material includes body fluids, such as semen, vaginal secretions, 
cerebrospinal fluid, synovial fluid, pericardial fluid, pleural fluid, peritoneal fluid, human 
milk, amniotic fluid, saliva associated with dental procedures, and body fluid that is 
visibly contaminated with blood. All body fluids should be considered infectious 
in situations where it is difficult or impossible to differentiate between bloody fluids. 
Any unfixed tissues or organs (other than intact skin) from a human (living or dead) 
are also considered potentially infectious material. For laboratory personnel, other 
potentially infectious material includes HIV-containing cell or tissue cultures, organ 
cultures, and HIV or hepatitis virus-containing culture medium or other solutions, as 
well as blood, organs, or tissues from experimental animals infected with HIV, HBV, 
or HCV.
Care for HCP who have been exposed to blood or potentially contaminated fluids 
has been reviewed.46,53,54,58–62 Exposed HCP should immediately be provided withBox 6
Methods of reducing percutaneous, mucous membrane, or nonintact skin exposure to blood
or potentially infectious body fluids
 Strict adherence to standard precautions including appropriate hand hygiene and use of
personal protective equipment (eg, gloves, gowns, masks, and eye shields)
 Use of safety engineered devices (needles, syringes, scalpels, etc.)
 Use of double-gloves during surgical procedures with an increased risk of glove puncture
 Use of blunted surgical needles, when possible
 Work practice controls to reduce risk of injuries, such as elimination of capping needles,
using a tray to pass sharp devices, and immediately and appropriately discard used sharp
instruments
 Puncture resistant sharp disposal units
 Precautions should be taken to prevent sharps injuries during procedures and during
cleaning/disinfection of instruments
 Mouthpieces, resuscitation bags, or other ventilation devices should be available whenever
their need can be anticipated
 Health care personnel who have exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis on exposed body
areas (hands/wrist and face/neck) must be excused from providing direct patient care or
working patient equipment (OSHA regulation)
 Enhanced education on the proper use of safety engineered device
first aid. Exposed mucous membranes should be flushed with water. Wounds and skin
sites that have been in contact with blood or body fluids should be washed with soap
and water. Antiseptics, such as chlorhexidine, have not been shown to reduce the risk
of HBV transmission. There is no contraindication, however, to their use as long as
they are not injected into the wound. It is not recommended to squeeze the wound
to express fluid or using potentially harmful agents, such as bleach. The following ex-
posures do not require PEP: (1) contact of intact skin with blood or body fluids; (2) skin
was not breached by a sharp; (3) contact with saliva (nondental), urine, vomit, or feces
that was not visibly contaminated with blood; and, (4) a sharp that was used before the
injury.
The source patient for blood and body fluid exposures should be tested for HIV us-
ing a 4th-generation test (combined antibody and antigen test), HBsAg, hepatitis C
antibody, and other tests as indicated by the source patient’s medical history (eg, ma-
laria, syphilis, or HTVL). If a source patient’s HCV test is positive, an HCV polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) should be obtained.
Hepatitis B
The risk of HBV acquisition by HCP has declined dramatically over the years. The
number of HBV infections among HCP declined by approximately 98% from an esti-
mated 17,000 infections in 1983 to 263 acute HBV infections in 2010.53 This decline
was likely due to decreased exposure from improved work practice controls (see
Box 6) and HBV immunization of HCP. The risk of HBV transmission from patient-
to-HCP provider remains, however, because there are an estimated 800,000 to 1.4
million persons in the United States living with chronic HBV infection.53
The key method of preventing health care–associated HBV infection among HCP is
HBV immunization prior to beginning direct patient care of all HCP with potential blood
or body fluid exposure. Furthermore, all HCP should know their immune response to
vaccination. For HCP immunized in training or at initiation of patient contact, an anti-
HBs quantitative titer should be drawn 1 to 2 months after the last dose of vaccine.
HCP with greater than or equal to 10 mIU/mL anti-HBs are considered immune for
life. HCP who do not respond adequately should be reimmunized with 3 additional
doses of vaccine and tested for immunity 1 to 2 months after the last (6th dose).
HCP who have not responded adequately (10 mIU/mL anti-HBs) should be tests
for HBsAg. Nonresponders to 6 doses of vaccine should be counseled to return to
report any exposures to blood or body fluids because they may be prophylaxed
with HBIG (Table 3). HCP, especially trainees, with a remote history of hepatitis B vac-
cine should have their immunity to HBV assessed using the algorithm recommended
by the CDC.53
HCP exposed to an HBsAg-positive patient should be evaluated for prophylaxis per
the recommended CDC algorithm (see Table 3). HCP with known to have responded
to vaccine (10 mIU/mL anti-HBs) do not need any prophylaxis; unimmunized HCP or
HCP with an unknown response should be managed per the CDC algorithm, which
may entail the use of hepatitis B vaccine and/or HBIG. PEP should be provided as
soon as possible but always within 7 days of exposure.53 HBIG and hepatitis B vaccine
can be administered simultaneously at separate injection sites.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus
The number of persons living with HIV infection has increased over the years in the
United States due to the success of antiviral medications. The CDC has estimated
that there are approximately 1.2 million people in the United States living with HIV
at the end of 2012, of whom approximately 12.8% did not know they were infected.63
Table 3
Postexposure management to prevent hepatitis B infection of health care personnel after occupational percutaneous and mucosal exposure to blood and
body fluids
HCP Status
Postexposure Testing Postexposure Prophylaxis Postvaccination
Serologic








Positive/unknown —e HBIG 2 separated by 1 mo — No
Negative No action needed
Response unknown after
3 doses
Positive/unknown <10 mIU/mLe HBIG  1 Initial revaccination Yes
Negative <10 mIU/mL None — —




Positive/unknown —e HBIG  1 Complete vaccination Yes
Negative — None Complete vaccination Yes
a HBIG should be administered intramuscularly as soon as possible after exposure when indicated. The effectiveness of HBIG when administered greater than
7 days after percutaneous, mucosal, or nonintact skin exposures is unknown. HBIG dosage is 0.06 mL/kg.
b Should be performed 1 to 2 months after the last dose of the HepB vaccine series (and 4–6 months after administration of HBIG to avoid detection of passively
administered anti-HBs) using a quantitative method that allows detection of the protective concentration of anti-HBs (10 mIU/mL).
c A responder is defined as a person with anti-HBs 10 mIU/mL after 3 doses of HepB vaccine.
d A nonresponder is defined as a person with anti-HBs less than 10 mIU/mL after 6 doses of HepB vaccine.
e HCP who have anti-HBs less than 10 mIU/mL, or who are unvaccinated or incompletely vaccinated, and sustain an exposure to a source patient who is HBsAg-
positive or has unknown HBsAg status, should undergo baseline testing for HBV infection as soon as possible after exposure, and follow-up testing approximately
6 months later. Initial baseline tests consist of total anti-HBc; testing at approximately 6 months consists of HBsAg and total anti-HBc.
From Schillie S, Murphy TV, Sawyer M, et al; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC guidance for evaluating health-care personnel for hepatitis B virus
protection and for administering postexposure management. MMWR Recomm Rep 2013;62(RR-10):1–19.
In the United States, 58 confirmed and 150 possible cases of occupationally acquired
HIV infection were reported to the CDC between 1985 and 2013.64 Since 1999, only 1
confirmed case (a laboratory technician who sustained a needle puncture while work-
ing with a live HIV culture in 2008) has been reported.64
The management of HCP exposed to blood or body fluids from HIV-infected per-
sons is well described in the literature.45,46,59–61,65,66 OSHA requires that all US health
care facilities provide postexposure management of HIV exposures consistent with
the most recent US Public Health Service guideline.60 This guideline delineates the sit-
uations for which expert consultation for HIV PEP is recommended as well as the rec-
ommended follow-up for HCP exposed to known or suspected HIV-positive
sources.60 The preferred HIV PEP regimen is Truvada (tenofovir disoproxil fumarate/
TDF [Viread], 300 mg, plus emtricitabine/FTC [Emtrival] 200 mg), 1 tablet orally once
daily, plus raltegravir/RAL (Isentress), 400 mg orally, twice daily (Table 4).60 The
authors’ retrovirologists prefer raltegravir to dolutegravir because dolutegravir has
more drug interactions and is substantially more expensive. The following antiretrovi-
ral agents should be used for PEP only with expert consultation: abacavir/ABC
(Ziagen), efavirenz/EFV (Sustiva), enfuvirtide/T-20 (Fuzeon), fosamprenavir/FOSAPV
(Lexiva), maraviroc/MVC (Selzentry), saquinavir/SQV (Invirase), and stavudine/d4t
(Zerit). The following agents are generally not recommended for PEP: didanosine/
ddI (Videx EC), nelfinavir/NFV (Viracept), and tipranavir/TPV (Aptivus). Neverapine/
NVP (Viramune) is contraindicated at PEP.Table 4
Alternative regimens for HIV postexposure prophylaxis
Column A Column B
Raltegravir/RAL (Isentress)








(Viread) 1 emtricitabine/FTC (Emtriva);
available as Truvada
Tenofovir disoproxil fumarate/TDF
(Viread) 1 lamivudine (Epivir; 3TC)
Zidovudine/ZDV/AZT (Retrovir) 1 lamivudine
(Epivir; 3TC); available as Combivir
Zidovudine/ZDV/AZT
(Retrovir) 1 emtricitabine/FTC (Emtriva)
Should combine 1 drug or drug pair from the left column with 1 pair of nucleoside/nucleotide
reverse-transcriptase inhibitors from the right column; prescribers unfamiliar with these agents/
regimens should consult physicians familiar with the agents and their toxicities).
The following alternative is a complete fixed-dose combination regimen, and no additional anti-
retrovirals are needed: Stribild (elvitegravir, cobicistat, tenofovir DF, emtricitabine).
Adapted from Kuhar DT, Henderson DK, Struble KA, et al. Updated US Public Health Service
guidelines for the management of occupational exposures to human immunodeficiency virus
and recommendations for postexposure prophylaxis. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol
2013;34:875–92.Invasive Meningococcal Infections
Neisseria meningitidis, a Gram-negative diplococcus and causative agent of invasive
meningococcal disease, has at least 13 serogroups based on capsular typing. Five
serogroups (A, B, C, W, and Y) cause most disease worldwide; 3 of these serogroups
(B, C, and Y) cause most of the illness in the United States.67,68 The incidence of inva-
sive meningococcal disease varies over time and by age and location.69,70 In recent
years, the incidence of invasive disease has declined in the United States.8 Based
Prior to the introduction of the varicella vaccine in 1995, varicella was a common dis-
ease; an average of 4 million people got chickenpox; 10,500 to 13,000 were hospital-
ized (range, 8000–18,000) and 100 to 150 died each year.80 Since the introduction of
the varicella vaccine, there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of cases of
varicella, hospitalizations and deaths.80 Because varicella may be acquired from
on reported cases in 2014, the CDC estimated that there were 450 cases (0.14/ 
100,000) and 65 deaths (0.02/100,000) in the United States.68
N meningitidis is transmitted person-to-person via respiratory and throat secretions 
(saliva or spit) during close (eg, coughing or kissing) or lengthy contact (eg, living in the 
same household).67 The carriage frequency of N meningitidis in children and young 
adults is approximately 10% in children and among young adults is approximately 
10%.71 Outbreaks most often occur in communities, schools, colleges, prisons, and 
other closed populations.67 HCP have acquired invasive meningococcal infection as 
a result of providing direct care (eg, assisting in endotracheal intubation and airway 
suctioning) to infected patients.72 It has been estimated that clinical microbiologists 
have an attack rate greater than 50 times high than the background rate of invasive 
meningococcal disease.73 For this reason, the CDC/ACIP recommend that clinical 
and research microbiologist who might be routinely exposed to isolates of N meningi-
tidis receive both the quadrivalent meningococcal vaccine (Men4ACWY) and the 
meningococcal serogroup B vaccine (MenB).8,28 Fatal meningitis in a microbiologist 
due to N meningitidis serotype B was recently reported.74 Such HCP should receive 
a booster dose of MenACWY every 5 years if they remain at increased risk.
Chemoprophylaxis of household members of an index case of invasive meningo-
coccal disease is recommended.41,42,75 Chemoprophylaxis of exposed HCP is 
advised for all persons who have had intensive, unprotected contact (eg, without 
wearing a mask) with infected patients (eg, via mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, endo-
tracheal intubation, or endotracheal tube management). Chemoprophylaxis for HCP 
should be recommended even if the HCP has been vaccinated with either the conju-
gate or polysaccharide vaccine.8 Because the rate of secondary disease for close 
contacts is highest immediately after onset of disease in the index patient, antimicro-
bial chemoprophylaxis should be administered as soon as possible (ideally less than 
24 hours after identification of the index patient). Conversely, chemoprophylaxis 
administered greater than 14 days after exposure to the index patient is probably of 
limited or no value. Oropharyngeal or nasopharyngeal cultures are not helpful in deter-
mining the need for chemoprophylaxis and might delay institution of this preventive 
measure unnecessarily.
There is strong evidence that several antibiotics (ie, rifampin, ciprofloxacin, and cef-
triaxone) and moderate evidence that other antibiotics (ie, azithromycin and cefixime) 
are highly effective in eradication of meningococcal carriage (90%–95%).76–78 The 
preferred drugs for exposed HCP are rifampin (600 mg orally every 12 hours for 
2 days) or ciprofloxacin (500 mg orally  1 dose). The preferred agent in pregnant 
women is ceftriaxone (250 mg intramuscularly  1 dose, diluted with 1% lidocaine 
to decrease pain at the injection site).41 Although sporadic resistance to rifampin 
and ciprofloxacin have been reported worldwide, meningococcal resistance to 
chemoprophylaxis antibiotics remains rare in the United States.78 This was recently 
reaffirmed in a recent population-based surveillance of antimicrobial resistance in N 
meningitis strains from the United States.79 All strains tested were susceptible to cef-
triaxone and azithromycin; 99% of strains were susceptible to ciprofloxacin and 
rifampin.
Varicella
exposure to varicella or zoster, however, exposure in health care settings will continue
to occur. Multiple nosocomial outbreaks of varicella-zoster virus (VZV) have been re-
ported.8 Nosocomial transmission has been attributed to delays in the diagnosis or
reporting of varicella or HZ and in failures to implement control measures promptly.
In hospitals and other health care settings, airborne transmission of VZV from patients
with either varicella or HZ has resulted in varicella in HCP and patients who had no
direct contact with the index case patient.80 Although all susceptible patients in health
care settings are at risk for severe varicella disease with complications, certain pa-
tients without evidence of immunity are at increased risk: pregnant women, premature
infants born to susceptible mothers, infants born at less than 28 weeks’ gestation or
who weigh less than or equal to 1000 g regardless of maternal immune status, and
immunocompromised persons of all ages (including persons who are undergoing
immunosuppressive therapy, have malignant disease, or are immunodeficient).80
Guidelines for postexposure management of HCP exposed to varicella or zoster
have been published by the CDC,8 AAP,41 and APHA.42 Exposure to VZV is defined
as close contact with an infectious person, such as close indoor contact (eg, in the
same room) or face-to-face contact. Experts differ regarding the duration of contact;
some suggest 5 minutes, and others up to 1 hour; all agree that it does not include
transitory contact.41 PEP with vaccination or varicella-zoster IG depends on immune
status of the exposed HCP. HCP who have received 2 doses of vaccine and who are
exposed to VZV (varicella, disseminated HZ, and uncovered lesions of a localized HZ)
should be monitored daily during days 8 to 21 after exposure for fever, skin lesions,
and systemic symptoms suggestive of varicella. HCP can be monitored directly by
occupational health program or infection-control practitioners or instructed to report
fever, headache, or other constitutional symptoms and any atypical skin lesions imme-
diately. HCP should be excluded from a work facility immediately if symptoms occur.8
HCPwho have received 1 dose of vaccine andwho are exposed to VZV should receive
the second dose within 3 to 5 days after exposure to rash (provided 4 weeks have
elapsed after the first dose). After vaccination, management is similar to that of 2-
dose vaccine recipients. Those who did not receive a second dose or who received
the second dose greater than 5 days after exposure should be excluded from work
for 8 to 21 days after exposure (see work restrictions discussed later).
For HCP at risk for severe disease for whom varicella vaccination is contraindicated
(eg, pregnant or immunocompromised HCP without evidence of immunity), varicella-
zoster IG after exposure is recommended. The varicella-zoster IG product currently
used in the United States is VariZIG (Cangene Corporation, Winnipeg, Canada).81 Var-
iZIG, if indicated, should be administered as soon as possible after VZV exposure,
ideally within 96 hours for greatest effectiveness but always within 10 days.81 VariZIG
is supplied in 125-IU vials and should be administered intramuscularly; the recommen-
ded dose is 125 IU/10 kg of body weight, up to amaximum of 625 IU (5 vials). If VariZIG
is indicated but not available or greater than 10 days have elapsed since the exposure,
PEP can be provided with oral acyclovir (20 mg/kg per dose administered 4 times per
day, maximum daily dose 3200 mg) or oral valacyclovir (20 mg/kg per dose adminis-
tered 3 times per day, maximum daily dose 3000 mg) beginning on day 8 postexpo-
sure and continuing for 7 to 14 days.
Pertussis
In the United States, the highest recorded annual incidence of pertussis occurred in
1934, when greater than 260,000 cases were reported.82 After the introduction of
diphtheria, tetanus, and whole-cell pertussis vaccine, the incidence dramatically
declined. In recent years, however, there has been a resurgence of pertussis. Possible
Tetanus
Tetanus is an uncommon disease in the United States, with an average of 29 re-
ported cases per year from 1996 through 2009.97 Nearly all cases of tetanus are
among people who have never received tetanus vaccine or adults did not stay cur-
rent with their 10-year booster shots. HCP are not at greater risk for tetanus than the
general population but like other adults may acquire tetanus if they are insufficiently
immunized and they have puncture wounds, contaminate open wounds, burns, or
crush injuries.8 HCP with injuries that could lead to tetanus should be evaluated pro-
vided appropriate PEP based on the nature of the wound (clean, minor wound vs
higher risk wounds) and their history of receipt of tetanus toxoid per recommenda-
tions of the CDC98,99 and AAP.41 If a tetanus toxoid and diphtheria toxoid (Td)
booster is indicated, Tdap can be substituted if the HCP has not already received
a Tdap.
explanations for this increase in disease include (1) genetic changes in Bordetella 
pertussis, making the vaccine less effective; (2) waning immunity among children, 
adolescents, and adults vaccinated during childhood especially those who received 
acellular pertussis vaccines; (3) lessened effectiveness of acellular pertussis vaccines 
compared with whole-cell vaccines; (4) greater awareness of pertussis and hence 
more diagnostic testing; and (5) the general availability of better laboratory tests.83
At the University of North Carolina Hospitals, pertussis is now the most common 
source of infectious disease exposure evaluations (David Weber, unpublished data, 
1994–2015). Multiple nosocomial outbreaks of pertussis have been reported, 
including outbreaks in which an infected HCP was the source.84 Nosocomial out-
breaks have occurred for several reasons: (1) failure to immunize all HCP with Tdap;
(2) failure to recognize and appropriately isolate infected patients, (3) failure to provide 
antibiotic prophylaxis to exposed staff, and (4) failure to furlough symptomatic 
staff.85,86 Seroprevalence studies of HCP who did not receive pertussis vaccine since 
childhood have revealed that 6.4%87 and 15%88 had evidence of recent infection.
Prevention of pertussis transmission in health care settings involves diagnosis and 
early treatment of clinical cases, droplet isolation of infectious patients, exclusion from 
work of HCP who are infectious, and PEP.8 Guidelines for postexposure management 
of HCP exposed to pertussis have been published by the CDC,8 AAP,41 and APHA.42 
Data on the need for PEP in Tdap-vaccinated HCP are inconclusive.89 Tdap might not 
preclude the need for PEP. Postexposure antimicrobial prophylaxis is recommended 
for all HCP who have unprotected exposure to pertussis and are likely to expose a pa-
tient at risk for severe pertussis (eg, hospitalized neonates and pregnant women). 
Other HCP should either receive postexposure antimicrobial prophylaxis or be moni-
tored daily for 21 days after pertussis exposure and treated at the onset of signs and 
symptoms of pertussis.
B pertussis is highly susceptible in vitro to erythromycin90,91 and the newer macro-
lides, azithromycin and clarithromycin.92 It is also susceptible to trimethoprim-sulfa-
methoxazole.91–95 Azithromycin has been demonstrated to be effective in the 
prophylaxis and treatment of pertussis.96 It is now the preferred agent because, 
compared with erythromycin, it requires a short period of PEP or therapy (5 vs 7–
14 days) and reduced dosing frequency (1 vs 4 times per day) and is less likely to 
result in gastrointestinal distress.96 Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole is the recommen-
ded alternative for treatment and for chemoprophylaxis of individuals intolerant to a 




Although diphtheria was a widespread disease in the United States prior to the use
vaccines, it is now a rare disease. Between 2004 and 2015, only 2 cases were reported
in the United States, although the disease continues to cause illness globally.100 The
case-fatality rate is still 5% to 10%. HCP are not at greater risk for diphtheria than the
general population.8 For HCP exposed to nasopharyngeal secretions of a patient
known or suspected to have diphtheria, the following postexposure measures should
be taken regardless of their immunization status: (1) surveillance for 7 days for evi-
dence of disease; (2) culture for Corynebacterium diphtheria, and (3) antimicrobial pro-
phylaxis with erythromycin (1 g orally for 7–10 days) or a single injection of penicillin G
benzathine (1.2 million U intramuscularly  1). Asymptomatic exposed HCP should
also receive a booster dose of Td, if they have not received a booster dose of a diph-
theria toxoid-containing vaccine within 5 years (Tdap is preferred if the HCP has not
received a dose of Tdap previously).41 Exposed HCP should not receive equine diph-
theria antitoxin because there is no evidence that antitoxin provides additional benefits
for contacts who have received antimicrobial prophylaxis.
Measles
The incidence of measles has decreased dramatically since the widespread use MMR
vaccine. Since 2000, when measles was declared eliminated from the United States,
the annual number of cases has ranged from a low of 37 in 2004 to a high of 667 in
2014.101 Measles cases in the United States occur as a result of importations by peo-
ple who were infected while in other countries and from transmission that may occur
from those importations. Nosocomial measles is well documented in the literature and
may aid in the propagation of community outbreaks.8,84,102–104 Investigations of indi-
vidual outbreaks have reported that 17% to 59% of cases were acquired in a medical
setting. Measles represents an important health hazard for HCP because of the
following: (1) it is highly infectious; (2) transmission via the airborne route; (3) persons
become infectious 4 days before the onset of the characteristic rash; and (4) transmis-
sion in the outpatient setting has occurred even though the index cases had left the
waiting or examination room up to 75 minutes earlier. Because of the greater oppor-
tunity for exposure, HCP are at higher risk than the general population for becoming
infected with measles.
If measles exposures occur in a health care facility, all nonprotected HCP should be
evaluated immediately for presumptive evidence of measles immunity.8 HCP without
evidence of immunity should be offered the first dose of MMR vaccine and excluded
fromwork fromday5 to21after exposure.8Availabledata suggest that live virusmeasles
vaccine, if administered within 72 hours of measles exposure, prevents or modifies dis-
ease. HCP without evidence of immunity who are not vaccinated after exposure should
be removed from all patient contact and excluded from the facility from day 5 after their
first exposure through day 21 after the last exposure, even if they have received postex-
posure intramuscular IG of 0.50 mL/kg; (maximal dose by volume, 15 mL). Those with
documentation of 1 vaccine dose may remain at work and should receive the second
dose. Immunoglobulin PEP is especially recommended for serosusceptible pregnant
women and immunocompromised persons intravenous (400 mg/kg). If IG is adminis-
tered to an exposed person, observations should continue for signs and symptoms of
measles for 28 days after exposure because IG might prolong the incubation period.
Hepatitis A
Occasional outbreaks of hepatitis A virus (HAV) have been reported in hospitals.105
Risk factors for HAV transmission to personnel have included activities that increase
the risk of fecal-oral contamination, including caring for a person with unrecognized 
hepatitis A infection; sharing food, beverages, or cigarettes with patients, their fam-
ilies, or the staff; nail biting; handling bile without proper precautions; and not washing 
hands or wearing gloves when providing care to an infected patients.105 Routine im-
munization of HCP with hepatitis A vaccine, however, is not recommended because 
seroprevalence studies have not demonstrated that HCP are at increased risk for 
HAV infection because of occupational exposure.8,105 Maintenance workers may be 
exposed to sewage are also not at increased risk for acquisition of hepatitis A and 
do not need to be vaccinated.
Hepatitis A vaccine may be used for PEP and control of nosocomial outbreaks for per-
sons 18 to 40 years of age.41 In these cases, only monovalent hepatitis A vaccine should 
be used and should be administered within 14 days of exposure. For persons 41 years 
old and older, IG (0.02 mL/kg intramuscularly) can be used, although hepatitis A vaccine 
can be used if IG is not available.41 The efficacy of hepatitis A vaccine and IG for PEP 
when administered more than 2 weeks after exposure has not been established.
Human bites
HCP may occasionally suffer from a human bite, especially when caring for psychiatric 
patients. After a human bite, a semicircular or oval area of erythema or bruising is usu-
ally visible; the skin itself may or may not be intact. Wound care of a human bite is 
similar to that of an animal bite.106 The bite area should be managed as follows: (1) 
clean the wound with an antiseptic; (2) trim any superficial devitalized tissue; (3) 
remove any foreign bodies or gross wound contaminants; and (4) assess the injury 
for tendon damage, vascular damage, or penetration into bone or joint. Most human 
bites should be left open to heal by secondary intention. If the wound may lead to a 
poor cosmetic result (eg, facial bites), however, the clinician may choose to close 
the wound. Human bites frequently develop infection. In general, all HCP with a human 
bite should receive antimicrobial prophylaxis with the first dose provided as soon as 
possible after the injury.107 An initial parenteral dose of antibiotics is often provided 
to rapidly obtain an effective tissue level followed by 3 to 5 days of oral antibiotics.107 
Recommendations for specific antimicrobial therapy have been published.107
All HCP suffering bite should be assessed as to whether tetanus prophylaxis should 
be provided. As discussed previously, human bites may lead to patient-to-HCP and 
HCP-to-patient transmission of blood-borne pathogens (HIV, HBV, and HCV). Thus 
the HCP is both an exposed person as well as a potential source for transmission; 
hence, the same blood work ordered on the source patient should be obtained from 
the HCP.
Rabies
Rabies is primarily a disease of animals.108 The epidemiology of human rabies is a 
reflection of both the distribution of the disease in animals and the degree of contact 
with these animals. Rabies is most commonly acquired via a bite or scratch from a 
rabid animal or from contact between nonintact skin and infective saliva. Saliva and 
nerve tissue are highly infectious. Generally, contact with other body fluids does not 
constitute exposure. Uncommon routes of infection include contamination of mucous 
membranes, corneal transplantation, exposure to aerosols from spelunking or labora-
tory activities, and iatrogenic infection through improperly inactivated vaccines. 
Human-to-human transmission has been rarely reported.108 Human rabies cases in 
the United States are rare, with only 1 to 3 cases reported annually.109
Rabies prophylaxis may occasionally need to be provided to HCP who work out-of-
doors (eg, maintenance workers and personnel who care for grounds) and suffer a bite
from a wild animal that could potentially transmit rabies (fox, raccoon, and so forth) or
who have bat exposure. Concern about rabies transmission is frequent among HCP
who have cared for human patients with rabies, especially because fluids from the up-
per and lower respiratory tracts of humans frequently test positive for rabies virus. One
review article reported that approximately 30% of HCP who provided direct care for a
patient with rabies were provided PEP.110 The CDC recommends that patients with
possible or known rabies be cared for using standard precautions.15 Given HCP con-
cerns and the rare possible risk of rabies transmission, however, the authors believe
that HCP should use PPE to prevent contact with a patient’s saliva and respiratory se-
cretions (ie, gown, gloves, and face shield or mask with eye protection). HCP with mu-
cous membrane or percutaneous skin exposure to a potentially rabid animal or human
should receive postexposure rabies vaccine and rabies IG as recommended by the
CDC.111
Ectoparasites
Exposure of HCP to ectoparasites (eg, scabies or pediculosis) is likely common. Such
exposed personnel should be evaluated for signs and symptoms of an infestation and
provided appropriate therapy for confirmed or suspected scabies.2 Prophylactic treat-
ment should not be provided to personnel, however, who have had skin-to-skin con-
tact with patients or other persons with ectoparasites (eg, scabies).2
Syphilis
HCP are at risk for acquired syphilis via unprotected contact with syphilitic skin le-
sions, such as chancres (primary stage) and rashes or sores (secondary stage). It
can also be acquired via contact with secretions of children with congenital syphilis.112
Prior to the standard practice of using gloves by HCP to examine patients with skin
lesions, there were reports of extragenital syphilitic lesions on HCP. Therefore, HCP
who have had unprotected contact with a patient with early congenital syphilis before
identification of the disease or during the first 24 hours of therapy should be examined
clinically for the presence of lesions 2 to 3 week after contact.41 Serologic testing
should be performed and repeated 3 months after contact or sooner if symptoms
occur. HCP with unprotected contact of skin lesions of a patient with primary or sec-
ondary state disease should be similarly managed. If the degree of exposure is consid-
ered substantial, immediate treatment should be considered.41 The most current CDC
sexually transmitted disease treatment guidelines should be used to guide postexpo-
sure therapy.113
Influenza
As discussed previously, all HCP should be immunized annually against influenza. The
CDC, however, has provided detailed recommendations on PEP for HCP exposed to
influenza as well as the use of antivirals in outbreak situations.114,115 Unvaccinated
HCP who have occupational exposures and who did not use adequate personal pro-
tective equipment at the time of exposure are potential candidates for chemoprophy-
laxis. Decisions on whether to administer antivirals for chemoprophylaxis should take
into account an exposed person’s risk for influenza complications, the type and dura-
tion of contact, recommendations from local or public health authorities, and clinical
judgment. Chemoprophylaxis with antiviral medications is not a substitute for influ-
enza vaccination when influenza vaccine is available. HCP receiving PEP should be
informed that chemoprophylaxis lowers but does not eliminate the risk for influenza,
that susceptibility to influenza returns once the antiviral medication is stopped, and
that influenza vaccination is recommended if available. Either oseltamivir or zanamivir
is recommended for antiviral chemoprophylaxis of influenza A (2009 H1N1), influenza
Table 5
Recommended work restrictions for health care personnel colonized/exposed or infected with selected infectious agents
Infection or
Infectious Agent Exposed or Colonized Infected (Duration of Restrictions)
Conjunctivitis
(adenovirus)
Exposed; no restriction unless illness develops Restrict from patient contact and contact with the patient’s environment
(until discharge ceases)
Cytomegalovirus No restriction No restriction
Diarrheal diseases No restriction unless illness develops Acute disease: exclude from duty (until >48–72 h after symptoms resolve)
Convalescent stage (Salmonella spp): restrict from care of high-risk patients
and food handling (until symptoms resolve; consult local and state
authorities for HCP/food handlers with Salmonella typhi)
Diphtheria Exposed: no restriction unless illness develops Exclude from duty (until antimicrobial therapy completed and 2 cultures
obtained 24 h apart are negative)
Hepatitis A Exposed: no restriction unless illness develops Restrict from patient contact, contact with patient’s environment, and food
handling (until 7 d after onset of jaundice)
Hepatitis B (chronic) — Restrictions based on review of only HCP who perform exposure-prone
procedures by expert panel (see text)
Hepatitis C — Restrictions based on review of HCP who perform exposure-prone











— Evaluate for need to restrict from care of high-risk patients
HIV — Restrictions based on review of HCP who perform exposure-prone
procedures by expert panel (see text)
Measles Exposed (susceptible HCP): exclude from duty (From the
5th day after 1st exposure through 21st day after last
exposure and/or after rash appears)
Exclude from duty (until 7 d after the rash appears)
Meningococcal
infections
Exposed: no restriction unless illness develops
Colonized (unrelated to invasive case): no restriction




Colonized: no restrictions unless or ill or
epidemiologically/molecular test linked to patient
infections
Allow to work provided lesions can be contained under a bandage and
clothes; if lesions on exposed area (eg, hand/wrists, face/neck), exclude
from duty (until lesions healed)
Mumps Exposed (susceptible HCP): exclude from duty (from the
12th day after 1st exposure through 26th day after
last exposure or after onset of parotitis)
Exclude from duty (until 9 d after onset of parotitis)
Pertussis Exposure (asymptomatic): no restriction unless develops
illness (PEP recommended)
Exposed (symptomatic): per active disease
Exclude from duty (from beginning of catarrhal stage through 3rd week
after onset of paroxysms or until 5 d after start of effective antimicrobial
therapy)
Rubella Exposed (susceptible HCP): exclude from duty (from 7th
day after 1st exposure through 21st day after last
exposure)
Exclude from duty (until 5 d after rash appears)
Group A
streptococcus
Colonized: no restrictions unless or ill or
epidemiologically/molecular test linked to patient
infections
Restrict from patient care, contact with patient’s environment, or food
handling (until 24 h after adequate treatment started)
Tuberculosis Latent tuberculous infection: no restrictions Active pulmonary tuberculosis; exclude from duty (until proved
noninfectious)
Varicella Exposed (susceptible): exclude from duty (from 10th
day after 1st exposure through 21st day [27th day if
varicella IG provided] after last exposure)
Exclude from duty (until all lesions dried and crusted)
Zoster Exposed (susceptible): same as varicella Localized, in healthy HCP: Allow to work provided lesions can be contained
under a bandage and clothes; if lesions on exposed area (eg, hand/wrists,
face/neck), exclude from duty (until lesions dried and crusted)
Generalized or localized in immunosuppressed HCP: exclude from duty (until




No restrictions unless illness developsa Febrile: exclude from duty (until afebrile for >24 h)
Afebrile: exclude from care immunocompromised patients (ie, patients cared
for in a protected environment) (until afebrile for >24 h or 7 d since onset
of symptoms, whichever is longer) – HCP should wear a mask providing
care until symptom-free
a Consider restrictions if HCP exposed to high-contagious disease transmitted by the respiratory route or close contact (Middle East respiratory syndrome–coro-
navirus, Ebola virus, etc.).
Adapted from Boylard EA, Tablan OC, Williams WW, et al. Guideline for infection control in health care personnel. 1998. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/
hicpac/pubs.html; and Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Immunization of Health-Care Personnel Rec-
ommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). MMWR Recomm Rep 2011;60(RR-7):1–45.
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Emerg Infect Dis 2005;11:1003–8.
6. Weber DJ, Rutala WA, Schaffner W. Lessons learned: protection of healthcare
workers from infectious disease risks. Crit Care Med 2010;38(Suppl):S306–14.
A (H3N2), or influenza B influenza virus infection. An emphasis on early treatment is an 
alternative to chemoprophylaxis in managing HCP who have had a suspected expo-
sure to influenza virus. Postexposure chemoprophylaxis is typically administered for a 
total of not more than 10 days after the most recent known exposure to a close contact 
known to have influenza.
Chemoprophylaxis can also be used as a control measure in outbreaks in health 
care facilities, especially if they house patients at higher risk for influenza complica-
tions.114,115 In addition to antiviral medications, other outbreak-control measures 
include instituting droplet and contact precautions and establishing cohorts of pa-
tients with confirmed or suspected influenza, reoffering influenza vaccination (if avail-
able) to unvaccinated staff and patients, restricting staff movement between wards or 
buildings, and restricting contact between ill staff or visitors and patients. Chemopro-
phylaxis should be considered for all employees, regardless of their influenza vaccina-
tion status, if indications exist that the outbreak is caused by a strain of influenza virus 
that is not well matched by the vaccine. Such indications might include multiple docu-
mented breakthrough influenza virus infections among vaccinated persons who other-
wise would be expected to respond to vaccination, studies indicating low vaccine 
effectiveness, or circulation in the surrounding community of suspected index case(s) 
of strains not contained in the vaccine. Specific antiviral dosing recommendations 
(drug, dose, route, and duration) are available from the CDC.
EVALUATION OF ILL HEALTH CARE PERSONNEL
HCP exposed to a communicable disease for which they are susceptible should be 
considered for work restrictions or furlough (Table 5). Similarly, HCP ill with a commu-
nicable disease susceptible should be considered for work restrictions or furlough 
(see Table 5). Importantly, infectious HCP have been the source for patient infection 
and the index case for outbreaks.84,102 HCP-to-patient transmission has been well 
documented for HIV, HBV, and HCV but has most commonly been reported with 
HBV. For this reason, infected HCP who perform invasive procedures should be eval-
uated by a special panel for the need for education, additional engineering controls, 
and/or work restrictions per current guidelines from the Society for Healthcare Epide-
miology of America116 and CDC.117 The differences between these guidelines has 
been described.120
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